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It is widely held that collegiate athletic directors are trapped in an expenditure arms 
race. But the arms race explanation completely omits the actual consideration of the 
university budgeting process. In its place, the arms race logic imposes strained 
assumptions about the cooperative setting and the naïveté of university 
administrators, along with a curious distinction of one type of revenue to reach its 
conclusions. And the interpretation of the data on spending and benefits from 
college sports has not been done particularly well in the past. This paper presents an 
alternative principal-agent explanation that is based on the observed actual financial 
(budget) relationship between university administrators and their athletic department 
and consistent with the entirety of the aggregate-level data on college athletics 
finance. Empirically discerning between the two models is crucial since each 
generates decidedly different policy implications. 
 
 
t is commonly held that college athletic 
directors (ADs) are trapped in an 
expenditure arms race. This arms race 
explanation (ARE) is so pervasive that it is 
now invoked casually in academic work and 
invoked in nearly every policy discussion of 
college athletics spending. The direct 
evidence taken in support of an arms race is 
rapidly escalating spending compared either 
to the general increase in prices or (and 
especially) compared to increases in 
spending on college academic programs. 
And inherent in that observation is that 
such spending is in excess of the value 
created. 
This paper offers an alternative 
principal-agent explanation (PAE) on 
observed college athletics spending.  Where 
the ARE ignores the university budgeting 
process entirely, instead choosing to cast 
ADs trapped in an arms race via a set of 
assumptions, the PAE is based directly on 
I 
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the actual relationship between university 
administrators (UAs) and their ADs. 
The inspiration for this line of thinking 
came from two distinct literatures.  Early 
on, there was a rejection of the ARE of 
predator-prey interaction in behavioral 
biology (Abrams, 1986). Later, Weingast & 
Moran (1983) and Weingast (1984) rejected 
models following Niskanen (1971) that cast 
“runaway” bureaucrats in control of their 
own spending. 
Of course, if strained assumptions give 
us the most analytical leverage over the 
observed outcome of college sports then 
they may be worth it. However, the PAE 
also turns the ARE observation that college 
sports are a net drain on the university 
budget on its head. Budget allocations by 
UAs to the athletic department are not “bail 
outs” but, instead, comparatively small 
investments in values across the rest of 
campus that both suit UA objectives and 
cover their costs. 
Whether the ARE or the PAE is 
operative is critical because each dictates 
entirely different policy approaches. For any 
given level of college sports output, the 
ARE dictates that wasteful spending is 
occurring to achieve that level. The policy 
prescription is to cut the wasteful spending 
and still achieve the same level of sports 
output. On the other hand, for that same 
level of college sports output, the PAE 
dictates that the budget of the athletic 
department, including the infusion of funds 
from the university budget, is sufficient to 
insure that level of sports output for UAs. If 
the PAE is in operation, following the 
dictates of the ARE and cutting spending 
can only reduce the values that college 
sports creates 1) across campus, 2) for 
college sports consumers, and 3) for 
students competing in college sports. 
This is not to argue that the level taken 
as given in this comparison is necessarily the 
socially preferred level. However, that level 
should be determined by its values and 
costs, not some possibly incorrect view that 
whatever level is determined, the process at 
the university will result in spending that is 
too high to achieve it. Determining which 
explanation, ARE or PAE, is in operation is 
essential to hitting whatever is the agreed 
upon target of college sports output. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In 
Section II, the ARE as it currently is applied 
to college sports spending is presented. The 
descriptive PAE is offered in Section III. 
Section IV summarizes the comparison of 
the empirical veracity of the alternative 
explanations. Policy implications 
accompany the conclusions in Section V. 
 
The Arms Race Explanation 
Edwards’ (1984, p. 7) reference to an 
athletic arms race in the recruiting and 
development of college athletes is the 
earliest I could find but an overview of just 
the most recent college sports “issues” 
journals reveals that the ARE is often now 
simply taken for granted.  Weight, Navarro, 
Huffman, & Smith-Ryan (2014, p. 394), in 
their paper on shifting governance and the 
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value of participation, provide the most 
extensive statement: 
This formal governance shift is 
troubling to some who believe it will 
hasten the arms race of extravagant 
expenditures…The arms race of 
expenditures represents a win-at-all-
costs phenomenon wherein athletic 
administrators outspend one 
another…The arms race has been 
pursued at all levels of intercollegiate 
athletics but some of the most 
detrimental effects of the spending are 
most clearly evident at the Division I 
Power Five level… [Italics added.] 
In that same journal, just in the most recent 
volume, similar use of the arms race as a 
motivation for research is in Brewer, 
McEvoy, & Pops (2014, p. 76); Sanderson, 
Hardin, & Pate (2014, p. 127); Huml, 
Hancock, & Bergman (2014, p. 425); and 
Cooper, Cavil, & Cheeks (2014, p. 325).  
Some of these cite the earlier work by 
Tsitsos & Nixon (2012) and Weight, 
Weight, & Schneider (2013).  Moving to the 
most recent issue of other sports “issues” 
journals, the list grows to include Sagas & 
Wigley (2014, p. 49); Lanter & Hawkins 
(2013, pp. 87-88); Staurowsky, Murray, 
Puzio, & Quagliariello (2013, p. 111-112); 
Sparvero & Warner (2013, pp. 123, 136); 
and Hoffer & Pincin (2016, p. 84). 
The ARE is also now gospel at the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA), among watchdogs like the Drake 
Group and the Knight Commission on 
Intercollegiate Athletics (henceforth, 
KCIA), and in popular media reports.  The 
earliest statement I could find among this 
variety of adherents puts it clearly enough 
(KCIA, 2001): 
The most glaring elements of the 
problems outlined in this report – 
academic transgressions, a financial arms 
race, and commercialization - are all 
evidence of the widening chasm 
between higher education's ideals and 
big-time college sports… [Italics 
added.] 
A time-series cross-section sample of the 
pervasiveness of this acceptance since then 
is KCIA (2009, 2010a, 2010b); Women’s 
Sports Foundation (2008); Fuoco (2010); 
Stafflord (2010); Gurey (2014), and Drake 
Group (2015). 
Analytical support of this view followed 
a few years later when KCIA commissioned 
Frank (2004) to provide an academic 
treatment (general economic coverage of 
arms races can be found in Arce & Sandler, 
2005, and Dixit, 2006, and their extensive 
reference sections).  Frank started his 
presentation with what is surely the clearest 
motivation of the ARE, Shubik’s (1971) 
dollar auction game.  An auctioneer 
enforces a non-cooperative setting with no 
talking among participants. Then the 
auctioneer holds up a dollar bill and 
announces that it will be sold to the highest 
bidder and that the auctioneer will also collect the 
bid of the second highest bidder. The result is 
over-bidding relative to the size of the prize. 
Since the second highest bidder will receive 
nothing in return, it is always in their best 
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interest to raise the bid even when the 
bidding exceeds one dollar. I can personally 
attest that the game produces precisely this 
result having used it for years myself as a 
teaching device. 
Frank (2004) then makes the 
assumptions required and applies Shubik’s 
(1971) logic directly to collegiate sports 
spending. College sports are assumed a non-
cooperative endeavor and Frank (2004) pays 
particular attention to the naïveté of UAs in 
estimating the probability of obtaining 
future values. Frank (2004) also assumes 
that all are chasing a fixed revenue prize and 
all are spending to chase it. According to 
Frank (2004), in such a setting it should be 
expected that more would be spent than the 
value created by college sports. The over-
spending is pure waste since the same prize 
could be had with less spending. 
Frank (2004) offers empirical support of the 
ARE in two steps. First, he shows that the 
typical athletic department result is spending 
in excess of “generated” revenues.  
“Generated” revenues include everything 
except the direct allocation by UAs from 
the general university budget to the athletic 
department budget.  This latter allocation is 
typically referred to separately as 
“institutional support”.  Second, he surveys 
the work of others at the time and 
concludes that the returns college sports 
generate across the rest of the university 
(on-field success, student applications, or 
general giving to the university) cannot 
cover “institutional support”. 
Frank (2004) concludes that if all 
athletic departments were to simultaneously 
reduce and cap spending, exactly the same 
college sport outcomes would be achieved, 
in quantity and in quality. Then KCIA Chair 
William Friday (President Emeritus, UNC-
Chapel Hill) said of Frank’s findings (KCIA, 
2004), “His study points to the need for an 
overall ‘stand down’ in the athletic funding 
‘arms race.’” 
 
The Principal-Agent Explanation 
This section presents a descriptive 
model of the PAE. A model is just an 
abstraction that can be compared in its 
explanatory value to other models. In true 
economic fashion, the model here is neither 
heavily documented nor judged closely by 
its bearing on reality (although my limited 
experience suggests it does so). Indeed, 
those interested in testing the model in ways 
different from the tests in this paper may 
succeed in replacing it with something else. 
But for now, the model offered here offers 
both interesting insights and alternative 
policy prescriptions. 
While there will be variations, a 
generally descriptive model of UAs and 
ADs can be based on the following 
elements of the observed nature of their 
environment. ADs operate in their 
university structure, their conference 
structure, and as one of the representatives 
of their university to the NCAA. In this 
setting, the relevant actors are UAs and 
their overseers (e.g., board of regents) and 
ADs. The process could be easily extended 
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to include conference commissioners and 
NCAA administrators. All care about 
income and upward mobility that, in turn, 
enhances their future welfare. In the context 
of their environment, enhanced welfare 
depends upon the performance of their 
respective organizations in the eyes of their 
hierarchical overseers. 
However, and this is a critical 
component, there can be areas of conflict 
between the goals of UAs and the self-
interested pursuits of ADs. The welfare of 
UAs depends on the performance of their 
agents along well-known dimensions—
research, teaching, and service.  While the 
definition of research and teaching are 
transparent, service may not be.  Members 
of the university are engaged in free 
outreach, information to the press and 
participation in press events, and 
entertainment. On the latter, some might 
think of fine arts offerings, especially music 
and dance. College sports are clearly another 
entertainment, also offered by members of 
the university. 
The ability of UAs to overcome 
conflicts with their agents in the provision 
of research, teaching, and service will 
depend on two things.  First, ADs will 
consider the net value of independent 
action that is possibly detrimental to the 
welfare of UAs; the higher that net value, 
the more often UAs will expect ADs to 
attempt that independent course of action.  
Second, the costs of monitoring to UAs will 
temper the oversight mechanism choice and 
the level of that oversight. 
This operational environment suggests a 
setting that is well known to economists, 
namely, UAs are “principals” to the 
“agents” in departments across campus 
(Ross, 1973; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  The 
agents are academic leaders and non-
academic leaders like ADs. The president of 
the university in consultation with the board 
of regents (most typically, but with some 
exceptions) controls the AD’s employment 
and pay subject to market forces and the 
costs of monitoring. Along this well-known 
line of reasoning, UAs have every incentive 
to create and manage institutional designs 
that harness the self-interested behavior of 
ADs to the enhancement of UA welfare. 
This is the essence of the PAE. 
If output is predictable and observable 
at discrete points in time, direct, hierarchical 
monitoring is possible and effective. If not, 
incentive compatible devices where the 
agent shares in specified, direct ways (e.g., 
profit sharing) may prove more effective. In 
the university case, apparently output is 
predictable and observable since UAs 
handle all of their principal-agent 
relationships through hierarchical oversight 
with only trivial incentive compatible 
mechanisms (e.g., performance bonuses to 
ADs). UAs organize the university into 
departments so as to facilitate the 
comparative advantages of each department 
along the lines of research, teaching, and 
service as well as to facilitate monitoring. 
The athletic-academic department 
design comparison is as follows. All of the 
assistant coaches in a given sport are 
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specialists in different areas just like 
individual faculty on the academic side (e.g., 
in football, strength and conditioning, 
position coaches, offensive and defensive 
coordinators). These specialists are 
organized under the head coach similar to 
an academic department and its chair. The 
collection of sports is organized into the 
larger unit, the athletic department, similar 
to schools or colleges on the academic side. 
To keep the analogy truly complete, we 
could refer to this as the “school of 
athletics” since, at the top of the athletic 
department, the AD is the equivalent of an 
academic dean (at least in terms of oversight 
and authority). The AD has associate ADs 
to handle the day-to-day operations of the 
department, freeing the AD to see to fund 
raising and external relations for the athletic 
department. The AD answers to the 
President (rather than the Provost on the 
academic side) and up the ladder to the 
board of regents and governor. 
The ultimate result of this principal-
agent structure is money and political 
support that is useful to UAs pursuing their 
goals. Services from all areas of the 
university flow out, under the three major 
headings of research, teaching, and service, 
and money and political support come back 
to UAs. In turn, hierarchically, through 
Deans and directors, including athletic 
directors, UAs allocate rewards back to 
departments. As is the typical principal-
agent result, agents including ADs are 
rewarded when they contribute to UA goals 
and face the prospect of reduced resources 
at least, and demotion or unemployment at 
most, when they don’t. 
Some doubt the power that overseers 
have over UAs or, in turn, the power that 
UAs have over ADs because of observed 
major oversight breakdowns such as the 
Southern Methodist University football 
program death penalty imposed beginning 
with the 1988 football season or the recent 
Penn State sexual predator scandal.  But the 
PAE explains this contingency—as long as 
monitoring is costly, and overseers act 
economically, there will be some 
transgressions that will not be caught until 
after the fact (if at all). We can all wish that 
it were not so, but it is.  So just finding 
holes in any oversight process is not 
evidence against the PAE. And focusing on 
the holes misses the greater point—by and 
large the oversight process works. 
If ADs do not contribute to UA goals, 
or if the athletic department becomes costly 
to the university in embarrassing ways, then 
UAs have recourse. For one, budget 
allocations to the athletic department can 
simply be reduced. Numerous examples 
where ADs reduced their budgets to meet 
university-wide reduction mandates by UAs 
during the recent economic downturn are 
presented by Cross (2015). Experience also 
reveals that budget cuts occur even without 
financial exigency. At the limiting extreme, 
there are interesting current and historical 
observations where King Football has 
simply been closed down altogether by 
UAs. But a careful case-by-case reading 
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shows that it was never going belly-up in an 
arms race that was the cause. 
Historically (tracking through the 
college football conference listings at the 
respected sports-reference.com), 6 Football 
Bowl Subdivision (FBS, Division I-A prior 
to 1978) football programs have been 
abolished—University of Chicago in 1939, 
Villanova in 1980 (although it returned a 
few years later at the Football 
Championship Subdivision, or FCS, level), 
CSU-Long Beach, CSU-Fullerton, and 
University of the Pacific in the 1990s, and 
Alabama-Birmingham in 2014.  The Ivies 
and a few departments from the Southern 
Conference and Southland Conference also 
moved to the FCS in 1981. 
Football was abolished at 54 FCS 
colleges (Division I-AA prior to 1978) 
starting in the 1920s and the most recent 
examples prove instructive of what causes 
this at this level of play.  UAs at 
Northeastern University cut its football 
program in November of 2009 and UAs at 
Hofstra University followed suit the next 
month. The official stance at Northeastern 
was, “The decision is consistent with the 
university's strategic approach to prioritize 
programs and invest in signature strengths” 
(ESPN.com News Services, 2009a). At 
Hofstra, UAs stated flatly that football was 
eliminated because of a general lack of 
interest among students and alumni, and a 
desire to spend the money to greater 
advantage on academic programs 
(ESPN.com News Services, 2009b). No 
public mention can be found in either case 
that this had anything to do with being 
pushed to absurd spending levels and finally 
throwing up their hands a la the ARE. 
There also are other dramatic actions 
familiar to all who follow collegiate sports 
that can be taken by UAs. Episodes of 
unsatisfactory performance and AD firings 
or forced resignations are well known and 
program quality blind. Just recently at two 
college sports icon programs, ADs David 
Brandon (Michigan) and Steve Patterson 
(Texas) began searches for new 
employment.  Some might argue that the 
sway of coaches over the process is being 
glossed over. But if they hold such sway, it’s 
interesting that the good ones change jobs 
often and are seldom happy with the actions 
of their UAs (historically, Bear Bryant; 
recently, Urban Meyer). And let’s not forget 
that their tenure is beholden to their UAs—
a nice way of putting that they also are fired 
on a regular basis. 
As with all things, not all departments 
are equally adept at each of the research, 
teaching, and service areas and an effective 
organizational structure would take this into 
account. Among academic departments, 
some are more about teaching and others 
are more about research. Compared to 
academic departments, the mix is different 
still for the athletic department. Although 
arguably there can be a research mission, 
there clearly is teaching (student athletes 
populate the coaching ranks and 
professional sports). But athletic 
departments truly shine in service 
(entertainment). 
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The PAE also puts an entirely different 
spin on “institutional support”, that is, the 
budget allocation to the athletic department. 
First, from the PAE perspective, all 
revenues to the athletic department are 
“generated,” some at the gate and 
attendance related (parking and 
concessions), some from TV, some from 
booster contributions (alumni and others), 
and still others in terms of the budget 
allocation from the university. It is rational 
for UAs to allocate these rewards to highest 
possible return among all departments 
including the athletic department. Second, 
there is no difference in the purpose of 
budget allocations to the academic side and 
the allocation to the athletic department. All 
“agents” compete on the basis of their 
relative success in the eyes of their UA 
principals. Athletic departments receive 
their share, as do all departments, through a 
competitive budgeting process at the 
university level. 
One final note concerns the actual 
functioning of budgeting. In all of the 
deliberations that lead to the final budget 
decisions of UAs, the purpose of the 
allocation is completely clear. As they do in 
all areas, UAs are attempting to see to the 
funding of an athletic department of 
optimal size and scope for their purpose. 
UAs then expect all departments to spend 
their entire budget to make good on the 
promises made during the battle for their 
budget share. As in all units on campus, it is 
expected that spending should equal all 
revenue, including the UA allocation. 
Members of the athletic department, 
from the AD through the associate ADs, on 
down to coaches and assistants, and finally 
the athletes themselves, provide 
entertainment services enjoyed by millions. 
The returns to UAs include the direct 
money payment that comes through the 
tuition component of grants-in-aid to 
athletes. More typically, the benefits not 
found in the athletic department bottom 
line include (Fort & Winfree, 2013): 
• Greater giving by alumni and other 
boosters to the general university 
fund. 
• A larger and better set of student 
applicants. 
• Favorable general budget treatment 
by legislators. 
• Better faculty and administrators. 
• Value added to athletes, some of who 
would not be at the university 
without athletics. 
The upshot of all of is a set of questions 
whose answers can separate the PAE from 
the ARE that are addressed in the next 
section: 
1. Do ADs operate in a non-cooperative 
setting? 
2. Are UAs and ADs naïve? 
3. Is it tragic to come in second? 
4. Does spending always rise to meet revenues? 
5. Does the value created by the athletic 
department across the university provide a 
reasonable return on the instutional support 
investment? 
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Arms Race or Principals and Agents? 
Do ADs operate in a non-cooperative 
setting?  
While incentives can be in conflict at 
the university, cooperative behavior 
abounds at all levels of college sports 
organizations. Examples include AD 
cooperation through their conferences in 
determining membership, setting schedules 
and rules, hiring officials, and designing 
conference championships. Cooperation of 
this nature is required in order to define and 
brand conference play. Cooperation 
through conferences also results in conference 
TV contracts to the economic benefit of its 
members and, more recently, the creation of 
conference sports networks (e.g., the ACC 
Network, Big Ten Network, the SEC 
Network, and the Pac-12 Networks).  
Moving up one level, in all sports except 
FBS football, ADs cooperate through their 
conferences and on up to the NCAA to 
determine national champions. The College 
Football Playoff that determines the FBS 
national champion is also a marvel of 
cooperation among “Power 5” conference 
commissioners that represent their 
individual conference members (Atlantic 
Coast Conference, Big 12, Big Ten, 
Southeastern, and Pacific-12), the sports 
network ESPN, and bowl organizers. 
The NCAA controls applications to 
advance to higher divisions. The NCAA 
also is a cooperatively designated marketing 
manager of many sports properties (videos, 
image use in video games). Finally, the 
NCAA is used cooperatively to reduce the 
economically competitive urges that cannot 
be controlled by members in conferences 
alone. The member institutions of the 
NCAA created the amateur requirement, 
recruiting restrictions, required letters of 
intent, the one-year sit out rule, and all rules 
governing practice time. The office of the 
President of the NCAA enforces these 
rules. 
Given this extensive structure of 
cooperation, it simply strains any sense of 
reality to suppose that ADs and their UAs 
act non-cooperatively. 
 
Are UAs and ADs naïve? 
Frank (2004) simply states that UAs are 
naïve, based on findings in unrelated 
research that some people have been observed to be 
naïve in some situations. However, to date, 
nobody has actually analyzed whether or 
not this is true of actors in collegiate sports 
and there is plenty of prima facie evidence 
to the contrary. All UAs and ADs “come up 
through the ranks;” they must satisfy 
relentless selection mechanisms. The result 
of such intense selection would typically be 
participants keenly aware of their 
environment and well trained for the job at 
hand. 
UAs are seasoned administrators and 
observers of the collegiate sports scene. 
ADs are astute students of business, many 
are lawyers, and all cut their teeth on the 
collegiate sports scene. While first hand 
management at the top level will be new to 
all at first, and mistakes are human, the idea 
that they are naïve seems far-fetched. 
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None of this would appear to the 
knowledgeable observer of sports 
management personnel to suggest any 
naiveté at all. 
 
Is it tragic to come in second? 
There is nothing at all to suggest that 
the fundamental underpinning of the 
ARE—that is, coming in second is truly 
tragic—characterizes college sports 
spending. “Tragic” in the ARE context 
means that all bidders pay but only one earns 
any return. While it is true that there is only 
one conference champion, and only one 
subsequent national champion, this is not 
“winning” in the ARE sense. All of the rest 
of the ADs also generate revenues and 
kudos for their competitive performances. 
Life is pretty good even for coaches and 
ADs at FBS institutions that seldom win 
their conference championship, let alone see 
post-season play. Nearly all of the athletic 
departments in Table 1 come in “second” 
nearly all the time but the revenue results 
appear to be far from tragic (shortly, it is 
made clear that there is nothing special 
about 2013-14 in this regard). 
Indeed, there is demand to enter the top 
levels of competition where the arms race 
should be most heated, rather than avoid it. 
Four schools earned bona fide FBS 
membership in 2013—South Alabama, 
Texas State, Massachusetts, and Texas-San 
Antonio. Four more will establish full FBS 
membership rights in 2015—Old 
Dominion, Appalachian State, Georgia 
Southern, and North Carolina-Charlotte. 
The UAs and ADs at these 8 recent entrants 
would all have to fall into the same trap 
under the ARE; that they were about to 
jump in to a long-established arms race 
situation, destined for tragedy. 
There is nothing at all to suggest that 
the fundamental underpinning of the ARE, 
that is, coming in second is truly tragic, 
characterizes college sports spending. 
 
Does spending always rise to meet 
revenues? 
The PAE tells us ADs should spend all 
of their budgets, including allocations from 
UAs, so that revenues equal expenses. 
There would be no reason to expect any 
budget deficits other than for the usual 
mistakes under uncertainty because these 
would be in nobody’s best interest.  It 
should be noted in passing that annual 
operations ignore the possibility of an arms 
race in capital, a possibility raised by Orszag 
& Orszag (2005a, 2005b). But the spending 
arms race is taken at large as a general 
explanation of spending. 
The NCAA commissions an ongoing 
survey of operating revenues and expenses 
for athletic departments in the different 
divisions of college sports (most recently, 
Fulks, 2015). The data are presented in two 
forms in the original documents, the median 
report (average report before 2004) and the 
largest report. In any given year, neither of 
these reported aggregates necessarily 
matches up to the same athletic department; 
the average revenue reported does not 
necessarily come from the same athletic 
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department that reports the average 
expenditure. But the NCAA finds this type 
of characterization of “average” and “large” 
programs useful so it is carried along here 
Simply combining the revenue and 
expense data for the FBS into Figure 1 (I 
first found this useful in Fort, 2010) 
presents an aggregate picture of collegiate 
sport revenues and expenses that is entirely 
consistent with the PAE, but not the ARE.  
First, at the average report through 2003, 
revenues and expenditures both grew at the 
same 4.6 percent real (inflation adjusted) 
annual rate. At the median report from 2004 
on, revenues and expenses grew at the same 
5.6 percent real annual rate. Second, the 
correlation between revenue and expenses 
during the period of average reports is 1.00 
and 0.99 during the period of median 
reports. Essentially, “average” athletic 
departments have enjoyed tremendous 
revenue growth and spend every dollar they 
bring in. 
It is difficult to make any call on “net” 
revenue since the revenue and spending 
reports are not necessarily from the same 
department.  In addition, there can be as 
much as a decade between the earliest 
reports (an examination across individual 
departments appears below). In any event, 
the largest excess of spending over revenue 
is 3 percent in 2014, at the median reports 
of the two.  
For the largest reported values, the real 
annual growth in revenues and expenses 
(both are reported from 1985 on) is 5.5 
percent and 5.1 percent, respectively. The 
correlation between revenues and expenses 
is 0.97. Unlike their “average” counterparts, 
the “largest” athletic departments don’t 
spend quite everything they bring in, but it 
is close. The interesting dip in reported 
largest spending from 2001-2003 and the 
slighter deviation over the last five years 
could do with further analysis.  Expenses 
exceed revenues only once in 1997 by 0.2 
percent. 
In passing, it is easy to see why some 
might view the increase in spending with 
alarm. The real annual growth rate in 
spending just noted at both the “average” 
and “largest” reports are large relative to the 
typical real growth rate in the economy. 
They are also large relative to the growth in 
spending on the academic side. However, 
worries about some form of collapse appear 
misplaced (Fort, 2010). The real annual 
growth rate in the average report of revenues, 
of course, matches the growth in expenses. 
Consistent with the budget process on 
which the PAE is based, the median- and 
largest-reports show ADs spending all of 
their revenue, including institutional 
support. Of course, this level of aggregation 
begs a more disaggregated examination. 
That may be had using the USAToday 
(2015) data on individual department 
revenues and expenditures.  This is a data 
base of high integrity, generated by 
Freedom of Information Act requests of 
individual athletic departments. 
The results are in Tables 2 and 3. 
Immediately, the correlations in Table 2 
across all FBS departments tell the same 
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story as the correlations over time for the 
median and largest reports in Figure 1. 
Essentially, departments spend every dollar 
they take in and this is true despite the 
broader variation from negative net 
revenues to positive.  The only possible 
exception would be 2005-06, when 
Oklahoma State recorded the largest 
contribution in the entire data set, 
$211,023,155, nearly twice the next largest 
(Oregon, $124,927,474 in 2013-14). When 
that outlier is removed, the correlation 
climbs again to the usual level in Table 2, 
0.983. 
As one would expect in cross-section, 
there is substantial variation around either 
the mean, median, or mode in any year. 
While the mode is always $0, only more 
detailed analysis of the position of every 
department in the distribution over time can 
tell the story from that perspective on the 
propensity to break even. However, 
revealed in Table 3, between 21% and 33% 
of the departments are within a quarter of a 
million dollars of $0 in any of the tabled 
years. 
Granted, revenues equal to expenditures 
could also be consistent with some other 
model of college sports outcomes not 
compared here. For example, Hoffer, 
Humphreys, Lacombe, & Ruseski (2015) 
model athletic department spending and 
find that athletic departments spend all 
revenue and practice “non-price” 
competition in their spending decision.  But 
this paper is long enough and a test of other 
models awaits both the specification of such 
an alternative test and the associated 
empirical work. 
 
Does the value created by the athletic 
department across the university provide 
a reasonable return on the instutional 
support investment?  
Frank (2004) read the literature on non-
revenue values from college sports one way, 
on a few dimensions (on-field success, 
student applications, or general giving to the 
university), and found them small at best. 
Without any formal comparison, he 
concluded that such small returns did not 
justify the level of institutional support. 
Fort & Winfree (2013, Chapter 3) detail 
how Frank’s appeal to past work on the 
values of college sports at the university was 
cursory at best. The latest data available to 
them was for 2010-11, and for “Automatic 
Qualifier” (AQ) schools at the time of the 
data reviews. The AQ schools included 
what is now the FBS Power 5 plus the Big 
East Conference. There were 54 AQ reports 
in the popular source they used. The Power 
5 would of course be the object of future 
analysis at this level.  They demonstrate that 
the tuition part of the grant-in-aid to 
student athletes that is paid to the university 
provides ample return in all but six AQ 
cases. 
For those remaining six, values across 
the rest of the university did not have to be 
very large, relative to the institutional 
support investment, in order to generate 
even a 5 percent return. A similar exercise 
revealed that the proportion of the rest of 
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the FBS departments that needed to rely on 
the values across the rest of the university 
was larger than for the AQ case. However, 
the level of these values required to generate 
a reasonable return was only an issue at a 
very few schools.  In addition, and contrary 
to some perceptions, the FCS ADs actually 
run their programs much more on a break-
even basis, program by program, than do 
their FBS counterparts. 
Fort and Winfree (2013) also show that 
the variety of values created across the rest 
of the university was much broader than 
Frank (2004) examined, even in the 
literature available to him at the time of his 
writing.  For example, the survey and 
extension in Goff (2004) revealed a broader 
array of values as well as some work touting 
higher values than those found by Frank 
(2004).  In addition, Fort and Winfree 
(2013) point out that work since then has 
revealed that this value is also much higher 
than Frank concluded. 
Humphreys & Mondello (2007), Tucker 
(2004, 2005), Tucker & Amato (2006), and 
Smith (2008) showed values from giving to 
the university rather than just the athletic 
department. Tucker (2004, 2005) also found 
football success increased the SAT scores of 
entering freshmen and enhanced graduation 
rates. Humphreys (2006) found that FBS 
football participation generated an 8 percent 
larger annual state appropriation than those 
without such programs.  It should come as 
no surprise, then, that Fort and Winfree 
(2013) reach the opposite conclusion of 
Frank (2004).  Even though each of the 
values may be small, in total the direct 
money payment via the tuition portion of 
grants-in-aid, plus the values across the rest 
of the university, are large enough to justify 
the institutional support investment made 
by UAs. 
All of this is completely consistent with 
the level of institutional investment 
generating sufficient return consistent with 
the PAE but not with the ARE. 
 
Conclusions and Policy Observations 
The principal-agent explanation 
outperforms the arms race explanation both 
in terms of its description of the actual 
process (rather than strained assumptions) 
and in its application to data on college 
spending outcomes. As always, one study 
never decides any issue and additional work 
exploring these competing explanations is in 
order. 
Formal development of the rigorous 
implications of the principal-agent 
explanation is surely needed in order to 
hone empirical propositions on college 
sports. The explanation should also be 
tested in other arenas. For example, the 
same type of data on revenue and expenses 
are available for Division II and Division 
III. Similar analysis to that done here for 
FBS universities can be done there in order 
to determine whether a principal-agent 
explanation generalizes to college sports 
where, ostensibly, big revenues appear not 
to be the goal.  In another spending area, it 
could be that arms race logic is operational 
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in other contexts such as capital investment 
covered by Orszag & Orszag (2005b). 
The principal-agent explanation should 
also be useful in university-athletics 
relationships beyond just the spending 
outcome. Surely a catastrophic failure of 
oversight led to the tragic sexual violence 
scandal at Penn State and the complete 
capture of the university vis a vis athletics in 
the SMU football death penalty episode.  
But the principal-agent logic also adds 
another consideration for the reform-
minded, namely, assessing how to improve 
those monitoring processes. 
If it stands later scrutiny, the principal-
agent explanation offered here changes the 
focus of policy intervention from remedies 
aimed at outcomes, like spending reductions 
and caps, to institutional design.  One 
important lesson from application of this 
explanation to bureaucratic processes is that 
principal-agent mechanisms afford 
principals chances to credit-claim and 
blame-shift (Weingast & Moran, 1983; 
Weingast, 1984).  On this dimension, blame 
shifting could be the explanation for survey 
reports by university administrators that 
they “feel powerless” to change collegiate 
sports (Knight Commission on 
Intercollegiate Athletics, 2009).  This claim 
rings hollow in the face of a history replete 
with examples of them doing just that, but 
is consistent with blame shifting. 
Another important principal-agent 
institutional design lessons is that effective 
oversight can generate complete alignment 
between the preferences of principals and the 
behavior of their agents, revealing that the 
stance of critics is not about oversight, but 
about the preferences of principals in the 
first place (Weingast & Moran, 1983, and 
Weingast, 1984).  If so, there is no principal-
agent problem.  Instead, and completely 
legitimately, others can only disagree with 
the preferences, not the process.  This is 
especially insightful to those constantly 
monitoring the mix of university outputs. 
But there are important policy 
observations in this context as well.  If the 
oversight process were working effectively, 
then instead of reducing waste, spending 
cuts and caps would produce a social loss.  
This loss would be in the form of reduced 
values created across the rest of the 
university, reduced satisfaction for those 
that enjoy the games, and, paradoxically, 
reduced satisfaction and future earnings for 
those students whose participation in 
college sports would be reduced.  This may 
or may not be what critics seek, but it will 
be true nonetheless. 
This is not to argue that the level of 
college sports output is necessarily the 
socially preferred level.  However, that level 
should be determined by its values and 
costs, not by applying an arms race view 
that whatever level is determined, 
overspending will occur. Determining which 
explanation is in operation, arms race or 
principal-agent, is essential if the institution 
of college sports is to produce whatever is 
the agreed upon level of college sports 
output. 
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According to the principal-agent 
explanation, if there is any problem with the 
level of athletic spending, it will be found in 
the “slack” in these levels of oversight—the 
choice of the level of spending on athletics 
by UAs is not at the level preferred by their 
overseers and/or there is a fundamental 
weakness in the oversight relationship 
between UAs and their AD principals.  
From the principal-agent perspective, one 
might see spending run away, but it is not 
“runaway spending” resulting from an arms 
race. And altering spending (after all, 
ineffective oversight might also allow 
overseers to underspend on athletics) would 
be only part of the remedy. 
Without meaningful reform of the 
oversight process itself, any problem with 
the level of spending will not be solved.  
For example, while hierarchical monitoring 
and oversight work for academic deans, 
perhaps there are better approaches with 
ADs.  Other incentive compatible 
approaches may be more valuable to 
university administrators, on net. 
--- 
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Tables 
Table 1 
 
Top 25 Revenues, 2013-14 
 
Department Total Revenue 
Texas (Big 12) $161,035,184 
Alabama (SEC) $152,588,651 
Ohio State (Big Ten) $143,718,564 
Michigan (Big Ten) $135,869,791 
LSU (SEC) $132,828,429 
Oklahoma (Big 12) $129,220,692 
Wisconsin (Big Ten) $124,928,916 
Auburn (SEC) $120,699,075 
Florida (SEC) $118,860,545 
Penn State (Big Ten) $117,590,993 
Notre Dame (Indep) $114,843,522 
Stanford (Pac 12) $110,240,490 
Southern California (Pac 12) $106,528,649 
Iowa (Big Ten) $105,508,954 
Florida State (ACC) $104,420,339 
Tennessee (SEC) $103,542,112 
Georgia (SEC) $103,495,587 
Minnesota (Big Ten) $100,707,642 
Washington (Pac 12) $100,275,186 
South Carolina (SEC) $98,439,097 
Kansas (Big 12) $97,681,067 
Arizona (Pac 12) $97,630,769 
Arkansas (SEC) $96,793,972 
Nebraska (Big Ten) $94,797,692 
Kentucky (SEC) $92,842,049 
  
ACC 1 
Big 12 3 
Big Ten 7 
Indep 1 
SEC 9 
Pac 12 4 
Total 25 
 
Source: Total revenue data are from U.S. Department of Education Office of Postsecondary Education (2015). 
  
 Journal of A
m
ateur Sport 
    Special Issue: Political E
conom
y            Fort, 2016 
 
139 
T
able 2 
 FBS N
et R
evenues and D
escriptive Statistics, 2004-05 through 2013-14 
 Source: U
SA
T
oday (2015). 
N
otes: T
he m
ode of the distribution of net revenues is alw
ays $0. D
epartm
ents listed for the average and m
edian are the ones closest to those values. B
esides the follow
ing exceptions, the “C
ontributions” 
category w
as alw
ays less than $50,000: O
klahom
a St., $211,023,155 (2005-06); O
regon, $73,809,775 (2009-10); T
exas A
&
M
, $53,388,379 (2011-12); and O
regon, $124,927,474 (2013-14). 
 T
able 3 
 D
istribution of FBS N
et R
evenues, 2004-05 through 2013-14 
 Y
ear 
N
O
BS 
(Bottom
, -$250K
) 
(-$250K
, $0) 
$0 
($0, $250K
) 
($250K
, T
op) 
(-$250K
, $250K
) 
2004-05 
98 
20%
 
6%
 
7%
 
19%
 
47%
 
33%
 
2005-06 
97 
29%
 
3%
 
4%
 
13%
 
51%
 
21%
 
2006-07 
97 
21%
 
6%
 
6%
 
14%
 
53%
 
27%
 
2007-08 
97 
21%
 
6%
 
6%
 
9%
 
58%
 
22%
 
2008-09 
98 
34%
 
4%
 
8%
 
16%
 
38%
 
29%
 
2009-10 
99 
14%
 
7%
 
11%
 
11%
 
57%
 
29%
 
2010-11 
99 
14%
 
6%
 
6%
 
12%
 
62%
 
24%
 
2011-12 
99 
21%
 
3%
 
7%
 
11%
 
58%
 
21%
 
2012-13 
102 
24%
 
10%
 
5%
 
9%
 
53%
 
24%
 
2013-14 
104 
19%
 
5%
 
9%
 
14%
 
53%
 
28%
 
Source: A
uthor’s calculations on the data cited in T
able 2. 
Y
ear 
N
O
B
S 
B
ottom
 
D
ept 
T
op 
D
ept 
A
ve 
D
ept 
M
edian 
D
ept 
S.D
. 
C
or(T
R
,T
E
) 
2004-05 
98 
-$7,887,618 
C
al 
$23,854,329 
G
eorgia 
$1,036,137 
C
olo. St. 
$212,796 
E
. M
ich. 
$3,796,348 
0.984 
2005-06 
97 
-$10,328,595 
H
oust. 
$161,063,918 
O
k. St. 
$2,925,221 
O
hio St. 
$283,016 
C
. M
ich. 
$16,791,840 
0.849 
2006-07 
97 
-$9,448,172 
Iow
a St. 
$15,669,822 
Florida 
$1,489,534 
C
olo. St. 
$315,605 
A
kron 
$4,460,433 
0.988 
2007-08 
97 
-$6,206,372 
N
. T
exas 
$19,470,624 
A
uburn 
$2,039,345 
S. C
arol. 
$472,461 
LA
-Laf. 
$4,232,118 
0.991 
2008-09 
98 
-$20,029,043 
O
k. St. 
$20,309,228 
T
A
&
M
 
$531,060 
S. C
arol. 
$50,755 
U
T
E
P 
$4,097,565 
0.990 
2009-10 
99 
-$6,903,058 
N
. T
exas 
$44,538,251 
O
regon 
$3,065,298 
O
re. St. 
$527,994 
W
. M
ich. 
$7,022,244 
0.982 
2010-11 
98 
-$8,374,016 
Flor. St. 
$23,398,586 
K
S St. 
$2,999,663 
U
tah St. 
$1,245,060 
U
tah 
$5,302,547 
0.990 
2011-12 
98 
-$16,261,224 
M
issouri 
$37,910,104 
T
A
&
M
 
$2,348,193 
B
G
SU
. 
$553,646 
LA
-M
on. 
$7,211,448 
0.982 
2012-13 
102 
-$7,993,152 
C
olo. 
$27,168,637 
A
labam
a 
$2,594,777 
Flor. 
A
tl. 
$361,951 
M
aryland 
$6,136,687 
0.990 
2013-14 
104 
-$13,714,440 
W
ash. St. 
$85,651,966 
O
regon 
$3,175,279 
V
A
 
T
ech 
$427,851 
O
hio 
$10,468,298 
0.969 
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Figure 1 
 O
perating R
evenues and E
xpenses (2009) 
 
 Source: From
 the N
C
A
A
 revenues and expenses data, m
ost recently Fulks (2015). 
N
otes: Largest R
eported T
otal R
evenue om
its 2006 ($260.7 m
illion $2009). In personal correspondence, the N
C
A
A
 R
esearch D
epartm
ent reported it w
as due to a very large gift. H
ow
ever, that should have 
nothing to do w
ith annual operations. 
  
